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Swiss Agency for Development  
and Cooperation SDC

# Global Institutions

Programme Framework 2021–24



*Cover Photo: Press Conference of the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development. © Loey Felipe*

# Preface



The global challenges brought by an increasingly globalised world can only be effectively addressed through multilateral agreements, strong partnerships and effective multilateral organisations. Multilateralism is fundamental to a liberal world order and has proved crucial in maintaining peace and fostering prosperity.

Despite the wide recognition of its importance, the multilateral system has faced challenging times in the past years. Unilateralist, often populist or nationalistic attitudes and the unwillingness to compromise have weakened the multilateral order and divided its members. The 2020 pandemic presents a vivid example of a challenge to the multilateral system. Its humanitarian dimension and its impact on long-term development remains to be fully understood and should serve as the ultimate wake-up call and opportunity to reinforce our strong commitment to multilateralism. The crisis has shown us how deeply connected we are to others and to the planet. It is forcing us to revisit our values and design a new era of development that truly balances economic, social and environmental progress as envisioned by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24 and the Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–23 complementary to its bilateral engagement, recognise multilateral cooperation as a centrepiece of Switzerland’s international cooperation. As an open and internationally highly dependent economy, Switzerland has a natural and legitimate interest in fostering multilateral cooperation. Switzerland builds its multilateral cooperation on its extensive thematic expertise and longstanding field experience. This allows Switzerland to inform international norm with high credibility, to leverage the international agenda-setting and to advance Swiss interests and intensify close alliances with key partners.

The Global Institutions division (GI) will contribute to the acceleration of the 2030 Agenda in a variety of ways. It will increase the quality of the inter-governmental debate, support progress on systemic reform of the United Nations and International Financial Institutions, and increase focus on three thematic priority areas: (i) gender, (ii) fragility, conflict and violence and (iii) financing for development. It will also contribute to the accountability for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and work towards an evidence-based and inclusive follow-up and review process, effective evaluation functions and better results orientation in priority organisations. Finally, it will seek to improve policy coherence in Switzerland’s multilateral cooperation.

With only nine years left for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, even more effective multilateral organisations with a strong political legitimacy and universal footprint are required to advance.

I am confident that based on these new features, GI will make a meaningful and lasting contribution to more effective multilateral organisations to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, in view of leaving no one behind.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Patricia Danzi', written over a white background.

Patricia Danzi

Director General of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

Bern, December 2020

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# 1. Context analysis

## 1.1. Global challenges and policy context

Over the last two decades, the global political and economic context has significantly changed. An increased sense of uncertainty, economic slowdown, insecurity and marginalisation in most parts of the world coincide with increased populism and criticism of globalisation. The international efforts to prevent and/or end violent conflicts have fallen short.

Since December 2019, the world has been dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, a crisis of monumental proportions whose humanitarian dimension and impact on sustainable development remain to be fully understood. Indeed, the pandemic is not only a health crisis, it is also an unprecedented socioeconomic crisis with negative impacts on the overall development progress of the past years as it severely jeopardises the achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The World Bank (WB) estimates that the crisis could push some 88 to 100<sup>1</sup> million people into extreme poverty in 2020 resulting in growing inequalities and again putting the most vulnerable at risk to be left behind. While the full economic impact of the crisis is difficult to predict, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the costs of the pandemic will be around USD 2 trillion causing severe fiscal constraints in OECD countries and putting pressure on official development assistance in general as well as on multilateral organisations. Further, the pandemic is adding a layer of complexity in so-called fragile contexts<sup>2</sup>, where half of the extreme poverty of the world is concentrated. Even before the crisis, the international community was looking for ways to enhance its work in these particularly complex settings. We are also witnessing a protection crisis, with increased gender-based violence. Interrupted schooling of some 1.6 billion children adds another layer of uncertainty. What is more, refugee and other forcibly displaced children, or otherwise marginalised young people are at risk of never returning to school.

The COVID-19 crisis has also given further urgency to the worsening sovereign debt situation of many low- and lower middle-income countries. The role of new, often intransparent and ambiguous creditors complicates both the assessment of debt burdens and international coordination. New calls for debt relief and a more prominent role of the United Nations (UN) vis-à-vis the established fora on this topic (the G20, the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF/ WB and Paris Club) will increase on the international agenda in the years to come. In this broader economic crisis/recovery context, the G20 will remain an important body of global governance and decision-making.

Despite the compelling need for cooperation and strong partnerships, in order to find solutions for global challenges, such as water and climate change, food insecurity, pandemics, resource scarcity, migration, forced displacement, education and peace and security, the multilateral system had already been going through difficult times long before the pandemic hit. Unilateralist nationalistic attitudes and the unwillingness to compromise persist and divide the traditional 'like-minded' countries. This weakens and re-shifs power within the multilateral world order with a relative decline of the United States (US) power and the emergence of China as an increasingly important contributor and claiming a bigger say in the multilateral organisations (MOs)<sup>3</sup> and a rival power to the US in these MOs. The US has always been an ambivalent but essential guarantor of the international system. The recent US presidential election results provide great potential in restoring some multilateral elements lost in the past years, including on climate change, the financing of the UN system and the solidity of some of its institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO).

<sup>1</sup> [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/projected-poverty-impacts-of-COVID-19](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/projected-poverty-impacts-of-COVID-19)

<sup>2</sup> Fragile situations are characterised by "the combination of exposure to risks and insufficient coping capacity of a state, system and /or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks" (OECD).

<sup>3</sup> China became the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest contributor to the UN regular budget in 2019, yet while China declares its commitment to strengthen the multilateral system, it has still to prove its adherence to the underlying principles.

With the COVID-19 pandemic already existing limits of the multilateral system have been revealed. This ultimate wake-up call can also be considered a force and opportunity, not only to 'build back better', but also to reinforce our investment and commitment in multilateral organisations. It also accelerates healthy discussions and actions for a new multilateral system, including on staff diversity. In this regard, the first response to COVID-19 was driven by local actors and gave a great push to localisation that would not have been achieved otherwise – an area that Switzerland supports strongly.

With ten years left for the achievement of the 2030 Agenda (decade of action), even more effective multilateral organisations with a strong political legitimacy and universal footprint are required to advance the implementation of international norms at global, regional and national levels. To remain relevant in supporting countries in their endeavours to achieve the SDGs and to mobilise domestic resources, multilateral organisations must adapt their business models. Additionally, a reflection about the coherence or rather inconsistency between the numerous governing bodies of the UN entities, but also on how to finance the system and the SDGs, is necessary.

## 1.2. Swiss interests

The International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24 and the Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–23 consider multilateral cooperation as a cornerstone of Switzerland's international cooperation due to the following reasons:

1. Switzerland's engagement in multilateral efforts stems from a political imperative rooted in an understanding of the interdependency of nations. As an open and internationally highly dependent economy, Switzerland has an obvious and legitimate interest in fostering multilateral cooperation.
2. The compact between the operational and normative work of multilateral organisations requires Switzerland to engage not only at the intergovernmental level but also with the operational work of the agencies providing Switzerland with an opportunity to oversee their work, hold them accountable and directly influence their operational approaches in line with national policy priorities.
3. Through its multilateral engagement, Switzerland's extensive thematic expertise and longstanding experience in development cooperation in its partner countries flows into international norms and agenda-setting, ensuring Switzerland's expertise is leveraged at global level.

The interconnectedness of the SDGs needs to be reinforced in the day-to-day work, to explicitly recognise the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainability and to significantly improve the strategic cooperation and coordination among them. The world was off track in achieving the SDGs before the COVID-19 crisis, yet the pandemic is an opportunity in recommitting to the 2030 Agenda as a shared roadmap to achieve 'the future we want' and 'build back better'.

Member states, however, are equally requested to help the multilateral system to play the role they want it to play. Multilateral organisations are what states and their leaders make of them. The late Richard Holbrooke, during his tenure as US ambassador to the UN, made a similar point in criticising the lazy habit of chastising the UN for failures of multilateralism. Such criticism, Holbrooke said, was akin to "blaming Madison Square Garden when the Knicks<sup>4</sup> lose."

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4 The 'Knicks' are a famous New York based Basketball team playing at home at Madison Square Garden.

4. Switzerland's candidature for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the period 2023/24 is a key part of Switzerland's peace and security thematic focus area in the 2020–23 foreign policy strategy and a continuation of its engagement for peace and security within the UN and throughout the world. The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation's (SDC) Global Cooperation department may enhance the candidature through its thematic expertise and as a link to the SDC as a whole.
5. Switzerland also plays an influential role in promoting important global reform agendas. By means of various instruments, Switzerland provides pragmatic and concrete thematic responses to the challenges in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. This also helps Switzerland advance its interests and forge close alliances with key partners resulting in a positive impact on Switzerland's image and the potential success of its foreign and economic policies. In this, the International Geneva has remained an important and perhaps even growing thematic hub for Switzerland to show excellence and convening power.

## 1.3. Swiss added value

The value added of Switzerland and the Global Institutions (GI) is:

**1. Leveraging/connecting thematic Swiss expertise at global level:** GI is at the crossroads between field expertise, both thematic and country-specific and the global, international and multilateral policy dialogue. Through Switzerland's network and support of Swiss representations as well as thematic knowhow and expertise within the SDC and the Federal Administration, including the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), GI promotes a fact-based, implementation and nexus-oriented, credible institutional dialogue with the multilateral organisations it manages.

**2. Institutional knowhow of the multilateral system as a whole:** Over the years, GI has gained valuable institutional knowhow and expertise in the area of the functioning of the multilateral system as a whole and more specifically on the WB and the UN funds and programmes. Switzerland therefore plays an important role in the promotion of a system-wide approach to challenge the UN Development System (UNDS) and to promote partnerships. Beyond the core institutions GI manages alone or in close cooperation with SECO (WB, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)), GI also oversees the budget for all 16 priority multilateral organisations<sup>5</sup> and thus acts as financial link also between regional development banks, thematic global funds and the GI-driven agenda.

**3. International networking:** GI acts through its networks and brings key players around the table informing the normative and strategic dialogue. It uses the exceptional role of Switzerland as an honest broker between different groups of interest. In this sense, GI also brings international actors together with its activities, i.e. like-minded actors and/or institutions that have similar values, ideas, or goals and strive for the same reforms, such as the reform of the UNDS. GI is well positioned to connect different actors across Switzerland's network of foreign representations and cooperation offices abroad and thus facilitate knowledge exchange between different levels and inform its policy and institutional dialogue. GI and its network, especially in New York is strong at using its field knowledge, when facilitating important resolutions such as those related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN System.

**4. National coordination and coherence:** GI pursues a whole of government approach across the Federal Administration when addressing global challenges within the international policy dialogue. GI mainly strives to ensure that solutions developed and negotiated jointly in inter-governmental processes take into account Swiss interests. As part of its core institutional mandate, GI supports especially the dialogue of finance for development in International Geneva, as host city of many international organisations and important actors of the private sector, such as banks.

<sup>5</sup> 1. World Bank and International Development Association (IDA), 2. African Development Bank and African Development Fund (AfDB/AfDF), 3. Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Fund (AsDB/AsDF), 4. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 5. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 6. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 7. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 8. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 9. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 10. World Health Organization (WHO), 11. Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), 12. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 13. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 14. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 15. Green Climate Fund (GCF), 16. Global Partnership for Education (GPE).



## 2. Results, lessons learnt and implications for 2021–24

### 2.1. Results

Within the scope of the Strategic Framework 2017–20, GI had articulated an overarching goal and three interlinked objectives.

**Overall goal:** Contribute to a multilateral system fit to deliver on the commitments of the 2030 Agenda working on its acceleration, accountability and coherence, based on four priority themes (i) gender, (ii) fragility, (iii) asset recovery/return, (iv) private sector partnerships

In the past four years GI has contributed to the following policy and programmatic achievements:

1. Through GI engagement with like-minded donors across its six multilateral priority organisations it contributed to enhanced cooperation among UN Funds and Programmes and the WB leading to streamlined working agendas on topics relevant across the governing bodies such as working methods, UNDS reform, cost recovery and prevention and peacebuilding.
2. Good progress on pushing the UNDS reform to increase the UN systems' efficiency and effectiveness at global level. The successful facilitation of the Quadriennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) resulted in (i) the delinking of the Resident Coordinator System from UNDP; (ii) the establishment of a new generation of country teams; and (iii) the elaboration of a new generation of UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF).
3. The UN-WB Partnership has seen progress at project and institutional level. On the WB side, Switzerland was very influential in shaping the World Bank Group (WBG) Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) Strategy with like-minded donors, resulting in the inclusion of commitments to systematise UN-WB collaboration in fragile settings.
4. Through an additional targeted contribution to UNDP, Switzerland has been a key partner for the reform that led to the creation of the Crisis Bureau (CB). The CB comprises different global programmes that have defined and implemented UNDP's preventive approach to fragility and conflict. CB's work has a wider impact on the UN system, providing a conflict-sensitive lens to the UNDS reform process.
5. Switzerland was very influential in shaping the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) and engaged actively in the HLPF and Reviews of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). GI was strongly involved when Switzerland successfully presented the first Voluntary National Review (VNR) at the HLPF in 2018. It supported better data for accountability (e.g. in the run up to the UN World Data Forum (UNWDF)) and a meaningful multi-stakeholder participation in the follow-up and review process.
6. Good progress on strengthening evaluation functions in our priority organisations (UNICEF and UNFPA) leading to the allocation of more financial resources to evaluations and higher quality evaluations through multi-bi support.
7. GI was actively engaged in numerous awareness raising activities on the 2030 Agenda. GI communicated the main elements of the UNDS reform and elaborated communication products on the multilateral institutions' response to the COVID-19 crisis.
8. Swiss Cooperation Offices: GI conducted various exchanges on several topics (VNR, UNDS reform, implementation of the WBG FCV Strategy, COVID-19 response of multilateral organisations) increasing the knowledge on key processes. For the Strategic Financial Planning 2020, it reactivated the platform of the multilateral network.
9. Gender: GI/Switzerland prioritised gender mainstreaming in the UN system, through our general support to UN Women but also through specific actions. For example, gender equality was one of six priority areas of the common chapter in the strategic plans of the four New York based funds and programmes. On a system-wide level, thanks to Switzerland's support as the only donor, the UN System-Wide Action Plan (SWAP) for Gender Equality is a success. Swiss support also ensured that the UN SWAP was translated down to the UN Country Team (UNCT) level. Switzerland further capitalised on the opportunity of the COVID-19 response to leverage the UN system for improved gender mainstreaming.



10. Fragility: GI/Switzerland has contributed to systemic changes that have brought (i) improved capacity to work along the development-humanitarian-peace nexus in the UN system (working across the pillars) and in the WBG; (ii) improved work of the UN and the WB in fragile settings, including the cooperation between these two systems and (iii) a more conducive political setup at the global level to advance dialogue towards peaceful, just and inclusive societies.
11. Asset Recovery/Asset Return: Good progress has been made at the operational level in on-going and upcoming asset return cases (Abacha II, Kazakhstan II, Peru, Turkmenistan, new cases in the pipeline, e.g. Uzbekistan). Normative efforts have taken into account the operational expertise of Switzerland, where it has remained a strong and active actor.
12. Private sector partnerships: Switzerland has been advocating several of its priorities during the last few years and also during this last year, when Switzerland had the chair of the government group of the UN Global Compact (UNGC): (i) the integration of the Africa strategy into the wider UNGC strategic framework and (ii) more collaboration of the UNGC local networks with the wider UN system in the field, i.e. to have a Regional Coordinator (RC) as board member of each local network requested to cooperate more closely with the RC and with the UN country teams. Through the financial support of the UNDP Business Call to Action (BCtA), Switzerland was part of the establishment of an online impact measurement tool that allows member companies of the BCtA to measure the impact they have on the SDGs. This kind of work is important, since there are no established tools existing that allow companies to measure their impact in a systematic manner. If companies' impact is not measured, they can easily be accused of so-called 'SDG washing', i.e. not really doing what it takes to reach results in SDG implementation.
13. Good progress was made in streamlining the Core Contribution Management (CCM) Process and making an improved instrument known within the SDC. Considering the important amount allocated to multilateral development cooperation, measuring and reporting on the performance of the priority organisations remains essential.

## 2.2. Lessons learnt

The internal portfolio-review of GI lead to the following conclusions:

The strategic components (2017–20) acceleration, accountability and coherence still hold and are aligned with the International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24, the Foreign Policy Strategy 2020–23 and the Guidelines of the SDC's global instruments 2021–24. However, the portfolio review revealed also that a re-bundling of some parts around finance for development makes more sense today for the sake of increased focus in some parts of the 2030 Agenda. Staff capacities are essential to exert effective oversight and to lead a systematic coordinated institutional dialogue, influencing the multilateral organisations and fostering the inter-agency work. This said and more broadly, with a missing coordinated international development finance architecture, a deeper look into roles and responsibilities in how to best engage with the private sector and on rewiring the debt discussion would be warranted.

Given the complexity of global processes, preparations for funds and programmes (F&P) executive boards/WB spring and annual meetings are extremely time consuming and have

reached new levels during the COVID-19 crisis due to the virtual format of the governing bodies. Hence, better aligning the GI multi-bi<sup>6</sup> portfolio with GI's priorities and abandoning certain thematic engagements (e.g. Digital Agenda) will be essential to free resources for GI's core mandate. The width of the WB agenda would deserve additional human resources, as does the follow-up of the strategically and operationally growing AIIB: these resources could be bundled under a 'global banks' heading.

It is challenging to find staff with relevant competencies on functioning of the multilateral system as a whole but also on specific topics like Financing for Development (FfD), debt, etc. Additional institutional knowhow on intergovernmental processes such as HLPF, ECOSOC, General Assembly (GA) and priority multilateral organisations will need to be built more strategically and systematically if Switzerland wants to remain influential, known and accepted in assuming key roles in the multilateral sphere.

The portfolio review but also the COVID-19 response revealed the additional potential for more synergies with colleagues from the SDC's bilateral and global cooperation.

<sup>6</sup> GI manages both (i) a 'bilateral' budget for multilateral activities and (ii) the whole of the 'multilateral' budget, which mostly covers core contributions to multilateral institutions.

## 2.3. Implications for 2021–24

Recognising that revitalising the implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires a collective effort and sustained intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder engagement as well as effective multilateral organisations that support countries in their national efforts to achieve the SDGs, GI will focus on the following work streams:

1. GI will reduce areas of work only partially contributing to its core mandate.
2. GI will further increase selectivity for multi-bi interventions that have a high catalytic potential to contribute to GI's core mandate and that do have a high potential for scaling-up and systemic changes.
3. There was recognition on the need to strengthen the focus and use of resources on GI's core business absorbing the largest bulk of GI's Budget. In other words, areas such as governance and oversight, e.g. the Institutional Dialogue with priority organisations including pushing for systemic progress on UN and International Financial Institution (IFI) reform efforts, evidence-based and inclusive 'follow-up and review' process of the 2030 Agenda, effective system-wide evaluation functions and better results orientation in priority organisations, including through more sex disaggregated data will be further strengthened.
4. In close cooperation with the SDC's bilateral cooperation and the Humanitarian Aid (HA), GI will foster more 'checks-and-balances' from the ground: it will identify so-called champion countries with a strong ownership for bringing forward (i) the UNDS reform agenda with a particular focus on the implementation of the UNDS-reform on the ground, (ii) effective interventions of the WBG in fragile contexts and (iii) more experiences from the national level to the global level and vice-versa. Following the same logic, GI will explore ways to develop an enhanced and harmonised Swiss approach to the work that the multilateral system (UN, WB and other multilateral development banks (MDBs)) is doing on triple nexus and peacebuilding (i.e. sustaining peace). The Human Security Division at the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (HSD) is a central partner in this endeavour.
5. GI will reactivate the SDC multilateral network allowing to convene colleagues around important multilateral topics and trends, to share best practices and discuss common approaches aimed at strengthening coherence on multilateral development cooperation.
6. The 'How to finance the UN-System and the SDGs' will be high on the agenda for the next ten years. The thematic private sector partnerships will benefit from being housed under the broader FfD realm as an important means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda. There is also a need to sharpen GI's focus in complementarity of the role and mandate of the SDC's disaster response pool.
7. The role and focus of the GI Gender Focal Point will be re-defined in line with GI's general mandate, including streamlining of the gender portfolio as well as the clarification of division of labour between the gender focal points of the SDC, GI and the global programmes.
8. GI will re-integrate the element of multilateral policy coherence of Swiss positions at global level into the strategic component coherence. The potential of International Geneva as an important and growing hub also in the area of innovative financing mechanisms will be more strongly tapped to this end.
9. GI will invest more strategically and systemically in building the SDC's institutional multilateral capacities.

Throughout its fragility portfolio, GI will encourage the WB and the UN to further their collaboration in fragile settings, pushing the frontiers from the actual joint assessment towards more ambitious joint engagement. Fragility shall be an entry point for a more systematised and synergetic collaboration between GI and HA's multilateral engagement in particular on the UNDS reform in fragile contexts and issues such as impartiality and the nexus, inclusivity, protection, voice and accountability, strengthening of civil society, innovative finance and private sector engagement in fragile contexts.

# 3. Our commitment

## Overall goal

GI contributes to a multilateral system that effectively delivers to reach the objectives of the 2030 Agenda through leveraging expertise and knowhow within its existing networks.

GI acts as a catalyser and seeks to connect core contributions to the UN organisations, selected funds and international financial institutions with the relevant thematic knowledge in both headquarters and field offices. As such, it provides evidence-based guidance to the strategic orientations and effective implementation of its multilateral development partner programmes on the ground.

GI uses selected entry points to meaningfully contribute to its overall goal, such as a focus on three priority thematic areas: (i) fragility, conflict and violence, (ii) gender, (iii) finance for development with a particular focus on the role of the private sector (UN System) and asset recovery/asset return. It strongly pushes reform efforts in line with efficiency gains, such as the reform of the UNDS.

## Theory of change

If the positions of Switzerland/GI in multilateral institutions are credible and facts-based, then Switzerland will have a strong influence in the shaping of effective and efficient multilateral development organisations such as the UN funds and programmes (UNDP (+UNCDF), UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women), the WB and the AIIB, having an overarching coherent governance architecture maximising their contribution to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, because through selected inputs GI influences them significantly to act responsibly and meaningfully by focusing on well-delineated mandates and comparative advantages, partnering strategically among each other and with other stakeholders and prioritise activities around transformative entry points to deliver successfully the 2030 Agenda.

## Priorities and objectives for 2021–24

GI articulates its work along the following three interconnected strategic components:

1. GI contributes to reaching the SDGs more effectively and at a higher pace: Accelerate implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the context of the decade of action with a particular focus on transformative entry-points at country and thematic level.
2. GI contributes to transparent and reliable assessment mechanisms to ensure multilateral development cooperation reaches the neediest and leaves no one behind: Ensure the accountability for the 2030 Agenda.
3. GI contributes to enhanced and timely exchanges between multilateral development institutions and among the Swiss actors involved in multilateral development cooperation: Improve policy coherence within Switzerland's multilateral development cooperation.

### 3.1. Strategic component 1: Accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda

**Theory of change:** If Switzerland/GI uses the right entry points and mechanisms to influence the multilateral institutions, then the implementation of its partners programmes will contribute to an accelerated pace in reaching the SDGs, especially on selected and well coordinated issues within the SDC's international cooperation, because by closely associating and connecting real-time and thematic knowledge from the ground with multilateral headquarter endeavours GI manages to orient multilateral institutions in a credible and concrete way forward.

Priorities and outputs:

- 1.1 Focus on innovative and promising thematic interventions leading to an acceleration in reaching the 2030 Agenda's goals: Selected financial support to projects with high potential for systemic changes is defined including through the bolstering of the UNDS reform (e.g. scale-up of the SDG Fund early in the year) and through concrete and ground-based actions such as interventions in fragile contexts and on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (nicknamed the 'triple nexus').
- 1.2 Make use of acquired knowledge and instruments: In cooperation with other global programmes the operationalisation of the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR)<sup>7</sup> is tested (decade of action).

- 1.3 Recover from the effects of the pandemic through close follow-up of Swiss/GI core contributions and linking them up with other contributions within the multilateral network: The UN funds and programmes, IDA and the AIIB receive adequate guidance through its governing bodies, especially on its global and local responses to the COVID-19 generated global economic downturn.
- 1.4 The multilateral agencies funded by GI are adequately funded to fulfil their task: The contributions to the UN System and the World Bank remain substantial, predictable and suffer no significant downturn. Forthcoming replenishments and financial needs are secured in line with the relative positioning of IDA19 envelope and forthcoming replenishments
- 1.5 Make use of potentials and opportunities: The institutional dialogue on developmental issues with AIIB and UNCDF is intensified.
- 1.6 Strengthen the support for multilateral reform: Champion countries – with a strong ownership to (i) land the UNDS reform and increased multilateral partnerships on the ground, (ii) further explore the peace-humanitarian-development nexus – are identified and serve as base to further strengthen GI's relationship with the SDC at the country level.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. the Global Programme Climate Change and Environment (GPCCE) and the Global Programme Food Security (GPPS) have taken up the 'the GSDR levers' as working modalities and work explicitly on one of the six entrypoints suggested by the report, i.e. food systems. Reflect with the Global Programme Water (GPW) how to achieve better coordination among UN entities around the recently launched SDG 6 Global Acceleration Framework.

## 3.2. Strategic component 2: Ensure accountability for the 2030 Agenda

**Theory of change:** If Switzerland stays engaged on providing solid expertise and disaggregated quality data in multilateral institutions, then its multilateral partners are enhancing their own capacity to provide accurate and credible information about the progress of the 2030 Agenda, because shared instruments of management, monitoring and steering such as the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment (MOPAN) and the CCM system provide strong guidance in the way forward.

Priorities and outputs:

2.1 Remaining informed and credible: GI together with the SDC's Analysis & Policy division (A&P) and the bilateral cooperation have continued to play a crucial role in adding evidence-based value to debates on 2030 Agenda-related matters (VNR, HLPF, etc.). Thus, also ensuring that the neediest are reached and no one is left behind.

2.2 Enhancing capacities of multilateral partners: GI has set a specific, conducive focus on strengthening system-wide evaluation functions in future, while not leaving aside thematic evaluations, sometimes also country-led, to ensure effective delivery of the individual mandates, especially of the UN funds and programmes.

2.3 Define GI's role on the data agenda beyond the UN's Swiss hosted World Data Forum in 2021: the division of labour between the different involved FDFA services, including its representations in New York and Geneva and bilateral cooperation is clarified and roles and responsibilities are re-defined accordingly.

## 3.3. Strategic component 3: Improve policy coherence within Switzerland's multilateral cooperation

**Theory of change:** If Switzerland displays strong and coordinated positions on selected issues, then it contributes to a coherent, credible and predictable multilateral environment, leading to stronger and engaged multilateral institutions, because GI has coordinated and reached out early to its partners in development.

The focus of the coherence pillar is a mixture between multilateral policy coherence and communication/outreach efforts.

Priorities and outputs:

3.1 Strengthening multilateral policy and governance coherence in multilateral organisations (MOs): (i) a normative framework for sustainable development and cooperation and thematic engagement with MOs on defined thematic priorities has been elaborated; (ii) a strong exchange with GI's partners in development (SECO, multilateral divisions of the HA and of the Political Department, the HSD, bilateral cooperation, SIF, etc.) has been maintained or further enhanced; (iii) Switzerland's campaign and potential membership at the UN Security Council has been supported adequately.

3.2 Enhancing knowledge and outreach on multilateral issues to relevant audiences and positioning multilateralism in Switzerland: (i) significant actors to the multilateral agenda, including the Swiss civil society and the parliament have access to easily understandable information about the importance and relevance of the multilateral system; (ii) International Geneva remains central in the global discussion on sustainable finance, including also governance aspects of the digitalisation of the financial system. The 'Building-Bridges Week'<sup>8</sup> in Geneva and the SDG's finance-related work streams have been supported to that end.

<sup>8</sup> This annual event brings together the world of international finance and the UN organisations in view of increasing positively the impact of financial investments.

# 4. How we act – joint action on global challenges

## 4.1. Principles of action

GI's principles of action are aligned with the Guidelines of the SDC's global instruments 2021–24 and detailed hereafter:

**The 'wider' elevator approach:** GI establishes the links between the development reality on the ground and the multilateral debate on both normative and operational issues at global level and vice-versa. Where relevant, it includes the regional level. The elevator will seek to move both vertically and horizontally to ensure it captures the whole breadth of knowledge. A particular focus will be given to following up on the implementation of (i) the UNDS Reform and (ii) the WBG's activities and collaboration with UN agencies and other partners in selected fragile settings.

**The systemic approach:** GI will have a strong focus on the functioning of the multilateral system as a whole with the overall objective to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the multilateral organisations as well as their capability to deliver on and finance the SDGs. GI's communication efforts

will highlight the advantages of the wider UN system, including specialised agencies such as the WB/IMF and the MDBs as well as other priority organisations<sup>9</sup> of Switzerland.

**The bridge-builder approach:** Switzerland's pragmatic and evidence-based interventions at the global level have strengthened its convening power and contributed to the reputation of Switzerland as an honest broker with no hidden agenda and bridge builder in important facilitation mandates translating into influence on the international agenda setting and on the strategic orientation of the multilateral development system. This position should be used to advocate for a strengthened and coherent governance architecture consistently serving the overarching goal to implement the 2030 Agenda.

<sup>9</sup> AfDB, AsDB, IDB, WHO, UNAIDS, CGIAR, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), GCF, GPE, IFAD.

## 4.2. Global Institutions as competence centre for joint action on global challenges

GI will foster joint action on the following levels:

- 1. Collaboration within the SDC:** On policy thematic and institutional issues, GI will intensify interaction with the global programmes<sup>10</sup>, the HA and with other departments and thematic units/focal points, including Swiss representations abroad on respective bilateral/multilateral experiences ensuring that results, best practices and innovation from the SDC projects at all levels are fed into the international policy dialogue through Switzerland's representation in the governing bodies. In the interaction with the Executive Director Office (EDO) in Washington and the Missions in New York, Geneva, Vienna and Rome, continuous focus on subsidiarity between Bern and New York in day-to-day interaction will be applied. Regional Development Banks will be more intensely consulted in cooperation with the respective responsible staff.
- 2. Collaboration within the Federal Administration:** Within the Federal Administration, cooperation modalities and instruments are well established with SECO (WB, FfD), SIF, the General Secretariat Federal Department of Home Affairs (GS-FDHA) (gender), also with the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and the divisions of the Political Directorate (the United Nations and Industrial Organisations Division (UNIOD), the Sectoral Foreign Policy Division (SFPD), the HSD, Directorate of International Law (DIL), etc.) of the FDFA's Political Directorate both on institutional and thematic engagement with multilateral organisations.
- 3. Other collaborations:** Beyond the Federal Administration, GI works not only with other member states and international organisations but also with NGOs, think tanks, academia and the private sector in Switzerland and globally.

<sup>10</sup> (i) Close Cooperation with A&P on Agenda 2030; (ii) Reflect with the GPW on how to achieve better coordination and coherence among UN entities around the recently launched SDG 6 Global Acceleration Framework. (iii) Close cooperation with the Global Programme Health (GPH) on sexual and reproductive health and rights-related (SRHR). (iv) Sporadic cooperation with the GPCC and the Global Programme Migration and Development (GPMD) for inputs at UN and WB level.

## 4.3. Global Institutions as service provider for all SDC and beyond

GI also provides the following services:

- 1. Switzerland's multilateral development budget:** As the custodian of the multilateral budget of the Framework Credit Development Cooperation, GI manages the budget of the SDC's multilateral core contributions to all 16 priority organisations (see overview indicative multilateral financial planning in annex 3b) whose thematically and geographically institutional responsibilities are allocated to different SDC divisions and coordinates the strategic debate on multilateral resource allocations within the SDC's regional divisions, global programmes and SECO (for the IFIs).
- 2. The SDC's multilateral development network:** Through the multilateral network, GI actively promotes a more coherent approach within the SDC with regard to the multilateral and bilateral interaction with the priority organisations and the relevant multilateral processes.
- 3. CCM system:** GI manages and administers the SDC's CCM system and the Annual Multilateral Performance Assessment (AMPA) of results achieved by the multilateral priority organisations.. The core contributions and the corresponding results are thus brought together which allows for harmonised reporting throughout the SDC.

**4. IFIs board document management:** GI manages within the SDC and together with SECO the information flow for the executive board agenda for the priority international financial institutions (WB, AsDB, AfDB, IDB and AIIB) as well as for IFAD and the IMF with the objective of increased effectiveness through the leverage of Swiss expertise from headquarters and the Swiss representations abroad in the respective board discussions.

**5. CCM system:** GI and SECO promote increased representation of Swiss staff within all multilateral priority organisations that are within the mandate of the Global Cooperation and maintains a regular dialogue to promote Swiss candidates. They also sponsor Swiss nationals in the UN JPO (Junior Professional Officer) and UN Youth Volunteer Programmes. As institutional lead, GI also coordinates CINFO's efforts and liaises with the FDFA's United Nations and International Organisations Division in this regard.

## 4.4. Strategic steering

Monitoring and steering will be ensured at the following levels:

- In line with GI's aspiration of a pragmatic approach, the monitoring and the reporting on the implementation of the GI programme framework builds on existing processes and documents.
  - GI is continuously monitoring developments and new trends in the multilateral sphere in order to adjust its priorities if need be. This will be ensured through engagement in global multilateral policy debates, engagement of GI staff in expert groups and close interaction with key opinion leaders.
  - For each priority organisation, the CCM cycle, which is harmonised with the multilateral organisation's own planning cycle, establishes Switzerland's priorities and objectives and includes relevant indicators to measure progress.
  - For each of the three thematic areas, there is a SDC or a FDFA strategy or concept paper that on the one hand guides GIs engagement on the issue and on the other serves as receptacles for lessons emerging from the multilateral dialogue.
- For the systemic approach to the multilateral development system, the guiding documents include position papers established in response to relevant UN and WB reports and processes.
  - The monitoring of the GI strategic framework is supported by two annual documents:
    - The annual report is an accountability, planning and internal communication tool. A narrative part is complemented by aggregated selective result.
    - The annual workplan (*Detailplanung*) is a management tool that will reflect the outputs, activities, financial planning, major milestones and timelines of each individual staff member's responsibilities. Each individual output is linked to one of the eight outcomes of the results framework in annex 2 or allocated to 'GI core tasks'. These 'core tasks' are the regular items within GI's workload – such as CCM reporting and core contribution credit proposal writing, contributing to the annual assessment of results achieved by the AMPA.



## Dealing with risks – working assumptions

**International risks** include a further economic downturn, fueled by protracted economic and health crises in donor as well as recipient countries, putting in jeopardy the multilateral setting, through diminished means and delayed delivery on the ground. A major debt crisis is a medium risk. Our assumption foresees a gradual normalisation of the global situation, with key positive changes on the US political agenda, which may be offset by a creeping retreat of the United Kingdom. China will likely continue to build on its economic strength and political continuity. It is in our very best interest to find a shared understanding of multilateral responsibilities, including on debt-related matters.

**Domestic risks** include diminished growth and budgets, possibly affecting both core contributions to multilateral organisations, with an associated potential loss of reputation and influence of Switzerland in the governing bodies as well

as the general availability of financial and human resources. Our assumption foresees continuity at best, with a slight risk of reduced resources because of internal political considerations related to the mounting costs of the pandemic. It will be our endeavour to convince Switzerland's main stakeholders of the importance of the Swiss contributions and our shared global interests, in order to maintain the long acquired high reputation allowing for Switzerland to often *punch above its weight* in many international institutional settings.

**Operational risks** include a weakened capacity to deliver development results on the ground for core institutions as well as bilateral partners. Our assumption foresees below-expectation delivery throughout most of 2021, with a gradual rebound to a post crisis recovery mode, including potential new energies in light of revisited visions of the future 'building back better'. Poverty is however unlikely to be back to pre-2020 levels by the end of the strategic period.

# 5. Resources

The financial allocation and human resources are indicative and may be amended based on external influence or the SDC internal decisions.

## 5.1. Financial resources

The International Cooperation Strategy 2021–24 breaks down the basic allocation by type of multilateral organisation: 66% IFIs; 24% UN; 10% Funds and Networks.

### Multilateral budget

The total expenditures of around CHF 1,780,526,000 (core contributions) or an average CHF 445,131,000 annually are proposed for the next four years (see overview financial planning in annex 3a). This corresponds to the average yearly level of disbursement during the previous years.

The decreasing core contributions by other donors and investment approaches and light-earmarking of core contributions will continue to be at the forefront of the debate in the years to come. GI's coordination role will help to ensure coherence within the Swiss positions on these issues.

### Multi-bi budget

The annual 'bilateral' GI budget has experienced a 10% cut and will stand at CHF 13.5 million per year. Following the portfolio analysis it was concluded that a number of projects will be terminated after the current phase. Efforts are also being made to have some projects taken over by other divisions of the SDC. Further efforts will be needed to adapt the financial planning to ensure innovative initiatives can be financed within this strategic period.

## 5.2. Human resources

### General statement

As with any organisation dedicated to human development, human resources are the cornerstone of success. GI promotes thematic expertise and aims at sufficient, qualified and motivated human resources to fulfil the outlined mandate and to assure that Switzerland can make a difference.

Where appropriate, fewer but larger projects will help ease the work load and pressure on GI staff. GI is committed to using best working practices by seeking out continuously new efficiency gains and optimisations.

GI is constituted of 14 employees or 12.50 full time equivalents (FTE). Additionally, 0.5 FTE are located at the Swiss Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. At the time of publication of this framework, no major changes in human resources allocation are foreseen. However, the campaign for Switzerland's seat in the Security Council will put a lot of additional pressure on the Sustainable Development and Humanitarian (SDH) Team in New York and Bern which could require additional resources.

# Annex

## Annex 1: List of acronyms

<b>A&amp;P</b>	SDC division Analysis & Policy
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AIIB</b>	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
<b>AMPA</b>	Annual Multilateral Performance Assessment
<b>AsDB</b>	Asian Development Bank
<b>BCtA</b>	Business Call to Action
<b>CB</b>	Crisis Bureau
<b>CCM</b>	Core Contribution Management
<b>CGIAR</b>	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus disease 2019
<b>ECOSOC</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Council
<b>FCV</b>	Fragility, Conflict and Violence
<b>FDFA</b>	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
<b>FfD</b>	Financing for Development
<b>GCF</b>	Green Climate Fund
<b>GFATM</b>	The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
<b>GI</b>	Global Institutions division
<b>GPCCE</b>	Global Programme Climate Change and Environment
<b>GPE</b>	Global Partnership for Education
<b>GPW</b>	Global Programme Water
<b>GSDR</b>	Global Sustainable Development Report
<b>HLPF</b>	High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
<b>HSD</b>	Human Security Division, Directorate of Political Affairs, FDFA
<b>IDA</b>	International Development Association World Bank

<b>IDB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IFI</b>	International Financial Institution
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>MO</b>	Multilateral Organisation
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>RC</b>	Regional Coordinator
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SECO</b>	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
<b>SIF</b>	State Secretariat for International Finance
<b>SWAP</b>	System-Wide Action Plan
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAIDS</b>	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
<b>UNCDF</b>	United Nations Capital Development Fund
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNDS</b>	United Nations Development System
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNGC</b>	United Nations Global Compact
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>US</b>	United States of America
<b>VNR</b>	Voluntary National Review
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WBG</b>	World Bank Group
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Annex 2: Results framework 2021–24

### Overall objective:

GI contributes to a multilateral system that effectively delivers to reach the objectives of the 2030 Agenda through leveraging expertise and knowhow within the existing networks.

	Description	Suggested selective indicators of 'success'
<b>Accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda</b>		
<b>Strategic component 1</b>	Measurable progress on systemic UN and IFI reform (including system-wide approaches) and operational results are achieved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ The QCPR 2020 20 has a reliable results framework allowing measuring progress on UNDS reform</li> <li>→ As laid out in its FCV Strategy, the WBG enhances its effectiveness in fragile contexts by systematically analysing and addressing core drivers of fragility, conflict and violence, operational flexibilities, strengthening partnership with the UN system and its field presence</li> <li>→ System-wide evaluation across the UN will be strengthened</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic component 2</b>	Evidence-based and measurable results are achieved in the three thematic priority areas (gender, fragility-conflict-violence, financing for development incl. private sector/asset recovery/return in intergovernmental fora and in priority organisations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Normative frameworks in the thematic priority areas include Swiss positions</li> <li>→ Priority multilateral organisations articulate and implement coherent and results-orientated plans on the four thematic priority areas (e.g. FCV) and translate them into action at field level, e.g. UNDP's conflict prevention approach is reinforced through a committed senior management and an effective implementation at the field level</li> <li>→ A multilateral policy dialogue on violence reduction identifies concrete opportunities and creates high level commitment to reduce violence worldwide (SDG 16)</li> </ul>
<b>Ensure accountability for the 2030 Agenda</b>		
<b>Strategic component 3</b>	'Follow-up and review' process of the 2030 Agenda including FfD is evidence-based and inclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ The VNRs and the follow-up and review processes on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda including FfD are largely evidence-based and include substantive reporting on gender and LNOB</li> <li>→ The elaboration and presentation of the VNRs of Switzerland in 2022 at the HLPF is inclusive and allows for multi-stakeholder engagement (e.g. shadow reporting)</li> <li>→ Relevant stakeholders (e.g. civil society, private sector, academia) are systematically included in the intergovernmental debates and mechanisms</li> <li>→ Synergies and coherence across different sectors, SDGs and processes are purposefully promoted at intergovernmental level (e.g. ECOSOC/HLPF review)</li> </ul>

	Description	Suggested selective indicators of 'success'
<b>Ensure accountability for the 2030 Agenda</b>		
<b>Strategic component 4</b>	GI's multilateral priority organisations have improved alignment between new strategic plans (2022–25), objectives, results and resources as well as improved cooperation between the four F&Ps.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Priority organisations have harmonised their cost recovery methodology and report transparently</li> <li>→ Annual planning and reporting of priority organisations links results and resources</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic component 5</b>	Priority organisations have more effective evaluation functions and are more results-oriented focus on system-wide evaluations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ The results frameworks of the priority multilateral organisations are harmonised with the SDGs' indicators</li> <li>→ The implementation of evaluation recommendations are systemically tracked</li> <li>→ Priority organisations have resource targets for evaluation established and report on them</li> </ul>
<b>Improve policy and governance coherence for sustainable development within Switzerland's multilateral cooperation</b>		
<b>Strategic component 6</b>	Increased understanding within the SDC, the Federal Administration and the broader public on the role of multilateral development efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Understanding of the role of multilateral development cooperation and specific multilateral topics (e.g. Reform on the UN-Development System reform, Swiss positions etc.) is enhanced through a number of tailor-made communication products and outreach activities delivered by GI</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic component 7</b>	GI and the SDC's bilateral and global cooperation (HQ and field levels) collaborate and engage more closely on multilateral approaches and institutional/thematic issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ All new and rotational staff briefed on GI's multilateral engagement and work programme</li> <li>→ Support tools for multilateral engagement (e.g. field handbook) updated and built on best practices</li> <li>→ Partnerships established with selected number of SCOs on GI thematic / institutional priorities</li> <li>→ GI active engagement in thematic networks and relevant 'moments forts'</li> </ul>
<b>Strategic component 8</b>	Enhanced multilateral policy and governance coherence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ The multilateral network is reactivated and holds four meetings a year for enhanced coherence across the SDC on institutional and thematic priorities with multilateral organisations and on system-wide approaches</li> </ul>

## Annex 3a: Indicative financial planning

### Financial planning 2021–24

#### Programme framework of the Global Institutions division

##### Annual budget allocation according to components (tentative), in CHF

	source	2021	2022	2023	2024	2021–24
Budget for multi-bi projects	bilateral	13,500,000	13,500,000	13,500,000	13,500,000	54,000,000
UN funds & programmes, etc.	multilateral	112,952,000	122,627,000	122,907,000	122,940,000	481,426,000
IFI – Fund replenishments	multilateral	257,100,000	265,100,000	276,400,000	282,900,000	1,081,500,000
Capital increases IBRD/IFC/AIIB	multilateral	54,400,000	54,400,000	54,400,000	54,400,000	217,600,000
<b>Total budget allocation</b>		<b>437,952,000</b>	<b>455,627,000</b>	<b>467,207,000</b>	<b>473,740,000</b>	<b>1,834,526,000</b>

##### Annual budget allocation (tentative), in CHF

	source	2021	2022	2023	2024	2021–24
Global programme	bilateral	13,500,000	13,500,000	13,500,000	13,500,000	54,000,000
Multilateral cooperation	multilateral	424,452,000	442,127,000	453,707,000	460,240,000	1,780,526,000
<b>Total budget allocation</b>		<b>437,952,000</b>	<b>455,627,000</b>	<b>467,207,000</b>	<b>473,740,000</b>	<b>1,834,526,000</b>

## Annex 3b: Overall indicative multilateral financial planning

### Multilateral contributions (tentative), in million CHF

Categories	Multilateral institutions	2021	2022	2023	2024	2021–24	
<b>UN organisations</b>							
Core contributions:	UNDP	52,70	60,00	60,00	60,00	232,70	
	UNICEF	19,30	21,00	21,00	21,00	82,30	
	UNFPA	16,00	16,00	16,00	16,00	64,00	
	UN WOMEN	16,00	16,00	16,00	16,00	64,00	
	UNAIDS	10,00	10,00	10,00	10,00	40,00	
	WHO	5,90	5,90	5,90	5,90	23,60	
Fund replenishments:	IFAD 8/9/10	13,75	14,00	14,00	16,00	57,75	
	IFAD ASAP/10ff MDRI					0,00	
	UNV Core	0,80	0,80	0,80	0,80	3,20	
	UNV contr. (staff)	0,50	0,50	0,50	0,50	2,00	
	JPO Concept	3,70	3,70	3,60	3,20	14,20	
	UN Coord. RC/SDG/MPTF	3,50	4,18	4,56	4,99	17,23	
	UNCCD	0,30	0,30	0,30	0,30	1,20	
	UNRISD	0,45	0,45	0,45	0,45	1,80	
	<b>Total UN</b>		<b>142,90</b>	<b>152,83</b>	<b>153,11</b>	<b>155,14</b>	<b>603,98</b>
	<b>Global funds networks</b>						
Core contributions:	CGIAR	17,05	19,00	19,00	19,00	74,05	
	GFATM	22,75	22,75	21,00	21,00	87,50	
	GCF* funding for climate protection	37,50	37,50	37,50	37,50	150,00	
	Partn. Glob. Education	12,00	12,00	12,00	12,00	48,00	
<b>Total GF/NW</b>		<b>89,30</b>	<b>91,25</b>	<b>89,50</b>	<b>89,50</b>	<b>359,55</b>	
<b>IFI – fund replenishments</b>							
AfDB Funds	AfDF-13/14/15	59,70	57,20	61,10	57,30	235,30	
AsDB Funds	AsDF-11/12/13	11,90	9,10	8,50	7,70	37,20	
IDA (WB) (.0331)	IDA 16/17/18/19	223,10	227,40	232,90	239,00	922,40	
MDRI (IDA/AfDF)	MDRI	34,00	37,70	43,50	43,90	159,10	
<b>Total IFI Funds</b>		<b>328,70</b>	<b>331,40</b>	<b>346,00</b>	<b>347,90</b>	<b>1 354,00</b>	
<b>Total multilateral contributions</b>		<b>560,90</b>	<b>575,48</b>	<b>588,61</b>	<b>592,54</b>	<b>2 317,53</b>	



**Capital increases (tentative), in million CHF**

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Multilateral institutions</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2021–24</b>
AfDB GCI	GCI	13,730	13,720	13,720	13,720	54,89
AsDB GCI	GCI					0,00
IDB GCI	GCI					0,00
IFC GCI general	GCI	16,830	16,830	16,830	54,350	104,84
IBRD GCI general	GCI	30,040	30,030	30,030		90,10
IBRD SCI selective	SCI	7,520	7,520	7,510		22,55
IIC GCI	GCI	0,763	0,763			1,53
AIIB GCI	GCI					0,00
<b>Total</b>		<b>68,88</b>	<b>68,86</b>	<b>68,09</b>	<b>68,07</b>	<b>273,91</b>

## **Imprint**

Editor:  
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This publication can be downloaded from the website [www.sdc.admin.ch/publications](http://www.sdc.admin.ch/publications)

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